9:25 PM
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is having a Blog-a-thon to celebrate its 15th anniversary. They are asking for stories about "click moments," the moment of first taking action in support of freedom in the digital world. This is my contribution to the EFF15 Blog-a-thon.
Like many people, I'm sure, I've taken many small steps towards online activism. But my click moment is obvious. I started this blog in January 2003. The direct impetus for starting the blog was that I was quitting my job to follow my fantasies. My fantasies, which I had been kicking around for at least six months, were based on music on the Internet. Specifically, my contention was that it was impossible to stop music from being distributed on the Internet. Rather than trying to fight it, I thought musicians should try to take advantage of that fact.
But that wasn't my real click moment. That came a few months later. By that time, my blog had mostly stalled. Then I saw a flyer for a symposium on copyright being run by the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology. Initially, I thought it sounded kind of interesting, but I'm not sure I thought much more than that. But before too long, I decided I had to go.
The decision to go was really the critical moment for me. I went. I came home and blogged about it. My blog instantly turned into a copyright blog. I attended legislative hearings. I started meeting other bloggers. And I went to more conferences. My friends started threatening interventions to save me from the copyfight lifestyle.
Copyright issues in the digital age are overwhelming. There's so much going on all the time that I eventually fell behind. I tried to play catchup, but catching up was even harder than staying on top of things in the first place. I fell out of the blogging habit. Since then, my blog posting has been somewhat hit and miss. I still post about the most important developments, but I haven't been posting regularly, despite attempts to get restarted.
But the important thing is that I still believe. The EFF is one of many groups fighting the good fight. I'm still a participant in that fight. I have faith in freedom on the Internet. I believe that action makes a difference, and has made a difference. I'm not sure that this is a fight that will ever be truly won, but I am sure that we'll keep fighting, and I'm proud to stand with the EFF on its 15th anniversary.
9:37 PM
It's apparent from Uzbradistan's comment on my last post that my writing about Sony and MGM v. Grokster hasn't been that clear. So now that I've read the opinion on Grokster (which was the real point of my recent posts), I'll attempt to explain what the rulings in Sony and MGM v. Grokster mean.
I'll start with copyright infringement generally. Copyright law is a combination of the written law as passed by Congress and of various rules that have come about through court decisions. The written statute defines copyright infringement, but court decisions have created additional forms of infringement.
The copyright statute grants a set of exclusive rights to copyright holders, limited by various exceptions also defined by the statute. If you write a book and I start publishing copies of it without your permission, I am directly infringing on your copyright, as defined by the statute. If, on the other hand, I write a review of your book and quote your book in my review, I am not infringing on your copyright even if I don't have your permission. Again, that's defined by the statute.
Court rulings have created two forms of indirect infringement. These forms of infringement are not defined by the statute. They also do not require violating the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. Contributory infringement occurs when one person "materially contributes" to the direct infringement committed by another. An example of a contributory infringer is a concert promoter. If the performer infringes on copyright by performing songs without the permission of the composer, the promoter contributes to the infringement by creating the audience for the performer. Without the audience, there would be no performance and no infringement, but the promoter does not directly infringe on the copyright of the composer. However, the promoter is still liable for contributory infringement.
Vicarious infringement occurs when someone has the ability to control potentially infringing behavior and receives benefits from the infringement. For example, someone who sells infringing copies of a CD at a flea market directly infringes on copyright. The owners of the flea market vicariously infringe because they are paid by the seller and because they can refuse to allow the seller to operate at the flea market. Like contributory infringement, the flea market owner does not directly infringe on copyright by selling the infringing items. The owner benefits from the infringing action, but does not participate.
Contributory infringement and vicarious infringement are not defined by the copyright statute. They have been defined through court rulings, with the consequence that they are not as clearly and distinctly defined as they might be if defined by statute. Many lawsuits alleging indirect infringement argue both possibilities, leaving the court to determine which applies, if either.
That brings us to Sony v. Universal. Sony invented the Betamax VCR. Universal Studios sued Sony under a theory of indirect infringement. The VCR does not infringe on copyright itself, but purchasers of VCRs can use them to infringe. The Supreme Court ruled that Sony was not liable for copyright infringement. VCRs can be used for infringing purposes, such as copying a copyrighted movie. They can also be used for noninfringing purposes, such as recording a TV program to watch at another time. Since VCRs can be used for noninfringing purposes, Sony was not liable for indirect copyright infringement.
The key holding of Sony is that the creator of a new technology is not liable for copyright infringement if the technology is "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." However, the precise meaning of that phrase is unclear. It could potentially include anything from "nonfringing uses are theoretically possible" to "a majority of actual use is noninfringing." Recent court rulings have widely varied in their interpretation of that phrase.
MGM v. Grokster, the first of these cases to reach the Supreme Court, gave the Court an opportunity to define "commercially significant noninfringing use." Alternatively, the Court could have rejected the Sony standard and created an entirely new standard for contributory infringement. Despite its unanimous opinion, the Court failed to clarify this issue. The opinion of the Court did not address this question at all, instead defining a third form of indirect infringement. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer each wrote a concurrence to the opinion. The concurrences battle on the definition of commercially significant noninfringing use.
Ginsburg's concurrence sets a high standard for substantial noninfringing use. While it's not clear how much noninfringing use is enough to avoid contributory infringement, the noninfringing use of Grokster's file sharing software clearly is not enough. She indicates that the proportion of actual noninfringing use to the total use determines whether it is commercially significant, but she does not state what proportion would be sufficient. She would hold Grokster liable for contributory infringement.
Justice Breyer argues the opposite result in his concurrence. He states that a mere theoretical possibility of noninfringing use is not sufficient to avoid liability. However, the evidence provided for noninfringing uses of Grokster's software demonstrates a capability for noninfringing use which is sufficient to avoid liability for contributory copyright infringement.
Three justices signed Ginsburg's concurrence and three signed Breyer's. Three signed neither. This gives a three to three ruling, which has basically no legal force and gives no indication of how the Court might rule in the future. The question of commercially significant noninfringing use remains unanswered. Despite this, the Court ruled unanimously against Grokster. The ruling avoids the question of noninfringing use and creates a new form of indirect liability instead.
The ruling states that Grokster may be held liable for inducing copyright infringement. Inducement can be explained through an analogy. Suppose I sell crowbars, advertising them as "Matt's Crowbars: Good for Construction." If someone buys one of my crowbars and uses it to break into a house, I can't really be held responsible for that. Suppose that instead I advertise them as "Matt's Crowbars: Good for Breaking and Entering." If someone uses one of my crowbars to break into a house, it makes sense to hold me indirectly responsible. By suggesting an illegal action and providing a tool to do it, I am causing, or inducing, that crime to occur.
The question from the Sony decision is how much noninfringing use qualifies as a commercially significant noninfringing use. That question is still unanswered. The question from MGM v. Grokster is what is sufficient to cause inducement. The Court found many inducing actions by Grokster and StreamCast, meaning that how much is enough is totally unclear. The inducement listed in the ruling includes:
Advertising to users of Napster
A name derived from Napster
Advertising showing infringing uses
Technical support to users who are committing infringement
A business model based on use of the software, given that most use is infringing use
Failure to attempt to block infringing use, in combination with the other evidence of inducement
Finding inducement is easy when there's lots of evidence for it. The question is when there's only limited evidence. For example, suppose a manufacturer advertises a use for a product which it believes is noninfringing. Apple advertisements for the iPod and iTunes use the phrase "Rip. Mix. Burn." Apple clearly believes that although it is encouraging copying, the copying is noninfringing. What if the advertised use is ruled to be an infringement? Suppose a court rules that copying songs to an iPod is an infringement. Would Apple be vulnerable to an inducement claim? At this stage, there are no definite answers. Further lawsuits may clarify things. But they may just create more of a muddle.
8:56 PM
Yesterday I posted my initial thoughts while reading the Supreme Court opinion of MGM v. Grokster. Today I will post any additional thoughts on the two concurrences on the ruling. Here's a quick review of the case and the Supreme Court decision, to be followed by my comments. Grokster (and StreamCast, its co-defendant) offer products which can be used to infringe on copyright. They were sued by MGM and other copyright holders for contributory and vicarious infringement on copyright. Grokster was held to not be infringing by the District Court and by the Appeals Court on the basis of Sony v. Universal, which held Sony not liable for copyright infringement for producing VCRs because the VCR is capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The Supreme Court overturned the Appeals Court ruling on the basis that Grokster's intent was to enable copyright infringement, making them liable for inducing copyright infringement.
Ginsburg's concurrence briefly acknowledges the discussion of inducing infringement in the opinion and then goes on to discuss contributory infringement. She focuses on "substantial noninfringing use" as applied in Sony. That ruling held that recording broadcast television programs to watch at another time constituted fair use, and therefore substantial noninfringing use.
The opinion did not address the question of contributory infringement, finding inducing infringement sufficient to create liability. While it raised the question of what type of behavior is sufficient to induce infringement, it avoided the question of what makes a noninfringing use substantial. Ginsburg would raise the bar for substantial noninfringing use. She dismisses the evidence presented in favor of noninfringing use in the case and indicates that the proportion of noninfringing files distributed over the network to the number of infringing files distributed should determine whether the noninfringing use is substantial.
She doesn't set any numbers, but it is clear that the noninfringing 10-25% of files available on Grokster is not sufficient. This is contrasted to Sony, in which 10% of taping was authorized by the broadcaster. The distinction here may be less clear than she intended, although it is true that Sony held that most of the taping of the other 90% of broadcasts constituted fair use, while she denies the possibility of any fair use in copying files over filesharing networks.
Breyer's concurrence is a response to Ginsburg. He states that because of the ruling on inducement, consideration of contributory infringement is not necessary. But since Ginsburg brought it up, he will discuss it as well.
I had the impression that Sony clearly stated that recording a program to watch at another time, even without the permission of the broadcaster, constituted fair use. Furthermore, recording programs to build a personal library was at least potentially fair use. Breyer asserts that Sony indicated that the first use might be fair use and the second is clearly not. As in Souter's opinion, Breyer's concurrence makes an interpretation of Sony that disagrees with my previous understanding of the ruling. Again, I can't judge at this time whether my previous understanding was inaccurate or whether the current ruling is seeking to change the meaning of the prior ruling without acknowledging that it is doing so. (Breyer later states that Sony did ultimately conclude that recording programs to watch at another time is in fact fair use. He initially minimizes that conclusion to strengthen the argument that a relatively low percentage of authorized use qualifies as a substantial use.)
Like Souter in the opinion of the Court and Ginsburg in her concurrence, he turns to patent law to resolve this question of copyright law. Ginsburg argued that capability for substantial noninfringing use was not sufficient. Substantial noninfringing use also had to occur in practice. Breyer quotes both previous rulings in patent cases and Sony to conclude that capability is sufficient.
Breyer then turns to the same statistics I questioned in Ginsburg's ruling. It's always exciting to find that a Supreme Court Justice shares the same thoughts you did on a case. Of course, he goes a step further, pointing both to the anecdotal evidence and the statistical evidence of authorized copying in Sony, rebutting Ginsburg's dismissal of the anecdotal evidence and her interpretation of the statistical evidence in the current case.
Breyer's discussion of contributory infringement is explicitly not directed toward the current case. He's protecting the freedom to create new technologies which may have both infringing and noninfringing uses. "But Sony's standard seeks to protect not the Groksters of the world..., but the development of technology more generally." I think that's awesome.
Dude. Breyer just gets better and better. He rhetorically asks if Sony should be modified or interpreted more strictly. "In particular: (1) Has Sony (as I interpret it) worked to protect new technology? (2) If so, would modification or strict interpretation significantly weaken that protection? (3) If so, would new or necessary copyright-related benefits outweigh any such weakening?" He answers, "Sony's rule is clear," "Sony's rule is strongly technology protecting," "Sony's rule is forward looking," and "Sony's rule is mindful of the limitations facing judges where matters of technology are concerned." That's just beautiful.
It's probably obvious that I think Breyer engaged in a glorious smackdown of Ginsburg. The fact that I'm inclined to agree with him probably has biased my judgment. Ultimately, my judgment isn't the important one. Three justices signed Ginsburg's concurrence and three signed Breyer's. That leaves three who signed neither.
Grokster and StreamCast have been nailed by inducement, but they are far from the only sources of file sharing technology. Some sources may have been more careful to not promote copyright infringement. Whether they can be found liable for contributory infringement depends on the three justices who signed neither concurrence. File sharing will return to the Supreme Court, and the next case will determine more about the relationship between technological advances and copyright than this one did.
10:51 PM
Today was a very big day for copyright law and the Internet. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that manufacturers of technologies which can be used to infringe on copyright are potentially liable for any infringing use of that technology by end users. The ruling in MGM v. Grokster is available as a PDF (thanks to SCOTUSblog for the link). My notes on the decision follow.
The ruling states that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties." In retrospect, this is not a surprising outcome. It was clear from the oral arguments that the Court still basically supported Sony but that they were uncomfortable with letting Grokster escape liability. By introducing the intent of the distributor, they can find Grokster liable without creating liability for any device which can potentially be used to infringe copyright.
The ruling calls Napster "notorious." Is that fair? It strikes me as hyperbolic, but it may well be accurate. There's a bit of a guilt by association thing going on. Napster is obviously evil, in the Court's view, and anything tied to Napster is also evil. StreamCast worked to get users of Napster to adopt their software, and Grokster gets in trouble because its name is derived from Napster.
The profit motive, at least as expressed on page 8 of the ruling, strikes me as problematic. While the software is being used, advertisements are displayed to the user. Obviously the companies want to encourage users to use the software more, so as to increase the advertising revenue, but there seems a logical leap from that statement to the conclusion that therefore the principal intended use was to infringe on copyright. Sony's income was from the sale of the VCR, not its use, but it's undoubtedly true that some VCR sales occurred for the purpose of infringing on copyright. Selling a device with the knowledge that it may be used for infringing purposes doesn't strike me as inherently different than advertising while software is being used, possibly for infringing purposes.
The business model itself isn't the problem. Encouraging users to engage in infringing uses, where those uses support the business model, may be a problem, but the ruling already established that the companies were encouraging infringing uses. I'm not sure how an advertisement based business model in itself suggests that the companies were dependent on infringement to succeed.
The ruling implies that the proportion of infringing use to noninfringing use is relevant to the question of liability. Is this expected use or actual use? Suppose I develop a technology with the expectation that it will be largely used for copyright infringement, but in fact the primary use turns out to be noninfringing. Am I liable for any infringing use which does occur? Either outcome feels problematic.
The ruling argues for indirect liability, stating that "[w]hen a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement." I agree that it's the American way to sue someone when you have been wronged. I also agree that an easy target for the lawsuit will always be preferred. I'm not sure I agree that in the absence of a desireable target, it's fair to create one by expanding the scope of liability.
One of the significant questions about this case was whether it would modify the Sony Betamax decision. Sony held that the manufacturer is not liable for a product which can be used to infringe copyright if the product is "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." MGM argued that noninfringing uses of Grokster were not commercially significant. This ruling recasts the Sony ruling as dependent on "presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use." It's not the noninfringing uses themselves, it's whether it was intended to be used for infringing purposes. The court sidesteps MGM's argument.
At the same time, I can't judge the validity of the Court's conclusion without reviewing the Sony decision. Sony is typically presented as hinging on capability of noninfringing uses. It's possible that this is a misrepresentation of the original decision, and the decision in fact is based on the intent for noninfringing use. It's also possible that the current ruling is changing the meaning of Sony while simultaneously denying that it is doing so. This merits further research and discussion.
I tend to resist lumping together copyright, patent, and other rights in information under the umbrella of "intellectual property." While copyright and patents both give rights to the use of information, the laws governing them are completely independent and referring to them as a single unit blurs their distinctions. The Supreme Court feels no such need to keep them separate. In supporting the claim that encouraging copyright infringement creates liability for copyright infringement, the ruling cites a list of cases of patent infringement. In this instance, at least, the Court does not distinguish between copyright and patents. But then the ruling states that the Sony ruling was also derived from patent law, so perhaps this is nothing new.
I generally trust the Supreme Court to have a sufficient understanding of new technology to be able to rule reasonably on the technology. This trust is reinforced by the proper use of the terminology and jargon of the technology. So the statement that "StreamCast beamed onto the computer screens of users . . . ads . . ." (page 20) makes me nervous. What exactly does "beamed" mean? It's not as bad as an egregious misuse of technical terminology, but the failure to use more specific language reduces my confidence that the Court knows what it's talking about. This is reinforced by the ruling's discussion of OpenNap, which strikes me as fuzzy. On the other hand, I don't know enough about OpenNap to evaluate the ruling's use of the term.
This concludes my notes on the first reading of the opinion in this case. There are two concurrences, but it is late and they will have to wait until tomorrow.
7:40 PM
I just have a quick observation following the record breaking opening of Revenge of the Sith. The original maximum term of copyright under United States law was 28 years. Coincidentally, Star Wars was originally released 28 years ago. The significance of this should be obvious to anyone who thinks the Special Edition versions of the movies were not improvements on the original theatrical versions of the movies.
George Lucas considers the Special Edition versions of the original Star Wars trilogy to be the official versions of the movies. Consequently, the original versions of the movies have never been released on DVD. Lucas also will not allow theatrical reshowings of the original movies. Since the duration of copyright has been extended to 95 years, it's safe to assume that almost no one old enough to have seen Star Wars in its original release will live long enough to have the opportunity to see the original movie in a movie theater or to view the movie on a legal, commercially released DVD.
Under the original terms of copyright, Star Wars would enter the public domain next year, giving fans the ability to watch the version they want. Under current law, relying on illegal bootlegs or accepting the changes Lucas has made are the only alternatives.
I'm mentioning this less as a call to action and more as an observation. Copyright law impacts fans as well as creators. This week, it's Star Wars fans' turn to be caught by copyright law.
5:05 PM
I've recently been playing a video game that's shockingly amoral. The striking thing is that it's not a game that's likely to get the attention of the Parents Television Council. Katamari Damacy is exceedingly weird, but it isn't violent. However, it strikes me as amoral in a way that no other videogame I've played has.
My goal here isn't to judge either the game or people who play it. I find Katamari Damacy addictive and can't blame others for enjoying it. My goal is just to explore my reaction to the game. I'm not certain I can adequately express my thoughts on the game, but I'm going to try.
The premise of Katamari Damacy is absurd. The King of All Cosmos has accidentally destroyed all the stars in the sky, and it is up to you to replace them. You do this by rolling a ball, called a katamari, around various environments. The ball sticks to everything it touches. As it accumulates stuff, the ball becomes larger and becomes able to pick up larger objects. Most levels have the objective of growing the katamari to a certain size within a time limit. If you succeed, the katamari becomes a star and you proceed on to the next level.
The game has an amazing range of scale. At the beginning of the game, the katamari is very small and you roll it around inside a house, picking up objects like stamps and thumbtacks. By the end of the game, the katamari becomes large enough to pick up buildings and even entire islands. Along the way, you pass through a range of intermediate sizes, including levels in which the goal is to pick up individual people.
I don't have a good answer to the question of why I care about the objects I pick up in the game, but I do. Part of the answer is that the game has realistic environments. On levels that are set indoors, I feel like I am rolling around in someone's house. As I pick up objects in the house, I identify it as someone else's stuff which I'm just taking.
But realism isn't the only reason why I respond the way I do. Burnout 3: Takedown, another game I've been playing recently, is the type of game that parents groups like to complain about. Burnout 3 is a car racing game in which one of the explicit goals is to crash and destroy your competitors' cars.
In spite of that, it doesn't make sense to me to speak of Burnout having any morality, good or bad. The scope of the game doesn't allow for morality. While Burnout has a very detailed environment, the only reason you exist in the game is to get to the finish line and to destroy other cars. Likewise, your competitors have no function other than to try to defeat you. Even innocent traffic only exists to be an obstacle, and one to be used to your advantage if you can.
Speaking of the game in moral terms implies a depth to the game that doesn't exist. Of course driving in real life as if you were playing Burnout 3 would be immoral, but Burnout 3 is just a game. Playing the game is neither moral nor immoral. And destroying a car in the game isn't a moral act. It's just playing the game.
The same logic should apply to Katamari Damacy. But that's not how I respond emotionally to the game. I respond to the objects in the game as real objects belonging to characters in the game. Even more, I respond to the characters as people. They flee from the katamari and scream when they are caught, and I can't blame them. Nonetheless, I gather them up, placing my goal of creating a star ahead of the the property rights or personal freedom of others.
My concern about the morality of Katamari Damacy hasn't stopped me from playing the game. But I do think about it. As videogames have developed, their detail, realism, and emotional depth have increased. Videogames can be more complex than they may appear to casual observers. And that complexity is worth studying. I'm not sure what my response to Katamari Damacy means, but I'd like to find out.
9:32 PM
Last month I posted about Jason Kottke and Jeopardy! The central idea of that post is that individuals who post material on the Internet are at risk of legal action from corporations under copyright law. However, the power of legal action isn't limited to corporations. The DMCA amplifies the power of individuals to take legal action against other individuals for what they post online, as demonstrated by a recent conflict between two LiveJournal users.
I am including links to the individuals and posts involved to demonstrate that this is a concrete example but not to get involved in this particular case. Things have recently settled down after being extremely heated and I do not want to cause things to flare up again. If you are tempted to post comments on the journals of the people involved, please reconsider.
The DMCA (Digital Millenium Copyright Act) is at the heart of this conflict. The DMCA was passed in 1998 and made several changes to copyright law. The relevant portion here is Section 512(c), the "takedown" section.
Section 512(c) makes Internet Service Providers responsible for the actions of their users. If a copyright holder reports to an ISP that one of its users has posted material which infringes on that copyright, the ISP must "act expeditiously" to take down the material. The ISP must also "take reasonable steps" to notify the user. The user then has the right to counter notify the ISP and state that the material is in fact not infringing. The ISP must then report the counter notification to the complainer and restore the material in "not less than 10, nor more than 14, business days" unless the complainer states that it is taking legal action against the user.
LiveJournal is a community oriented blogging tool (and a service provider under the DMCA). One of the features of LiveJournal is that posts can be either public or "locked," so that only LiveJournal users specified by the poster can read the post. Access is controlled on a post by post basis and can be changed after the fact.
On December 2nd, the LiveJournal user Ginmar posted publically about an article in The New York Times. Her original post provoked a strong response, both in comments on her post and in new posts by various other users. Ginmar responded in other posts in her journal as well and then locked the original post.
Another LiveJournal user, Cheshyre, responded by reposting Ginmar's original post, along with her commentary, in her own journal on December 4th.
On December 30th, Ginmar complained to LJ Abuse, LiveJournal's group for handling complaints about users, about Cheshyre reprinting her post. Ginmar may not have thought she was taking legal action when she complained to LiveJournal. In a comment thread in another user's journal, she asserted that Cheshyre was the first to use the DMCA. Nonetheless, LiveJournal responded by informing Cheshyre that they had received a DMCA takedown notification from Ginmar, and that if she did not remove the post by January 3rd, her account would be deactivated.
On January 2nd, Cheshyre edited the post to remove Ginmar's post and declared her intention to file a DMCA counter notification. According to LiveJournal's page on the DMCA, if Cheshyre did file a counter notification, they would inform Ginmar. If Ginmar failed to state that she is taking further legal action, the content would be replaced "after 14 business days."
As of January 24th, that's where things stand. Cheshyre's post is still edited. There has been limited public discussion of further action by either Ginmar or Cheshyre. Ginmar has locked some further public posts that she had made, making the record frustratingly incomplete. It has been about 14 business days since Cheshyre stated she would counter notify. Whether her post will be restored remains to be seen.
I think both Ginmar and Cheshyre would agree that things have gotten out of hand, although neither seems willing to back down. What I am struck by is the role of the DMCA and LiveJournal's implementation of the DMCA in the dispute.
The DMCA has gotten a large corporation involved in what is fundamentally a conflict between two individuals. Furthermore, it has pushed both of them into a legal escalation to resolve the situation. It is not clear that Ginmar thought of her original complaint to LJ Abuse as a legal action, but because of the DMCA, her next step in this conflict would be to contact a lawyer.
Hopefully, you will read this with alarm, for two reasons. Fundamentally, it's stupid for this to have become a legal dispute, but there they are. But also, like Jason Kottke and Jeopardy!, this could happen to you. Blowing up personal conflicts into legal actions is inherent in the DMCA. Copyright law isn't just some abstract thing that affects book publishers. If you post any material on the Internet, it has the potential to affect you, and you don't want to be on the receiving end.
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